Explained another way, though: Israel has launched military operations to disable and disarm Hamas in 2009, 2012, 2014, 2021, and many times inbetween: They have utterly failed to reduce Hamas' capabilities to launch attacks into Israel. I think this is why the Iraqi example is so instructive. Increasing conventional intensity can't dest…
Explained another way, though: Israel has launched military operations to disable and disarm Hamas in 2009, 2012, 2014, 2021, and many times inbetween: They have utterly failed to reduce Hamas' capabilities to launch attacks into Israel. I think this is why the Iraqi example is so instructive. Increasing conventional intensity can't destroy an insurgency that feeds on popular support for independence. In other words: More occupation only worsens a demand for less occupation.
You can't defeat Hamas by killing the current members of Hamas. You defeat Hamas by marginalizing them and giving their prospective recruits a better option.
Explained another way, though: Israel has launched military operations to disable and disarm Hamas in 2009, 2012, 2014, 2021, and many times inbetween: They have utterly failed to reduce Hamas' capabilities to launch attacks into Israel. I think this is why the Iraqi example is so instructive. Increasing conventional intensity can't destroy an insurgency that feeds on popular support for independence. In other words: More occupation only worsens a demand for less occupation.
You can't defeat Hamas by killing the current members of Hamas. You defeat Hamas by marginalizing them and giving their prospective recruits a better option.